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Abstract
This paper focuses on new characterizations of convex multi-choice
games using the notions of exactness and superadditivity. Further-
more, (level-increase) monotonic allocation schemes (limas) on the
class of convex multi-choice games are introduced and studied. It
turns out that each element of the Weber set of such a game is ex-
tendable to a limas, and the (total) Shapley value for multi-choice
games generates a limas for each convex multi-choice game.
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11 Introduction
Multi-choice games were introduced by Hsiao and Raghavan (1993a,b) to al-
low players in a cooperative environment to exert any of a ﬁnite number of
activity levels suitable to the situation at stake. An extension of this model of
cooperative games was introduced by Nouweland et al. (1995) to cope with
situations where diﬀerent players might have diﬀerent sets of activity levels
to participate with when cooperating with other players. Results on multi-
choice games can be also found in Calvo and Santos (2000), Calvo, Guti´ errez
and Santos (2000), Grabisch and Xie (2007), Klijn, Slikker and Zarzuelo
(1999), Nouweland (1993), Peters and Zank (2005). Additionally, the reader
can look at the survey on multi-choice cooperative games in Branzei, Dim-
itrov, and Tijs (2005). Our work on convex multi-choice games in this paper
is based on deﬁnitions and results from Nouweland et al. (1995) and Branzei,
Dimitrov and Tijs (2005), that we brieﬂy recall in Section 2. Then, in Sec-
tion 3, we give new characterizations of convex multi-choice games using the
notions of exactness and superadditivity. Inspired by Sprumont (1990), we
introduce (level-increase) monotonic allocation schemes (limas) for convex
multi-choice games in Section 4, and prove that each element of the We-
ber set of a convex multi-choice game is extendable to a limas. We also
show there that the (total) Shapley value of a convex multi-choice game (cf.
Nouweland et al., 1995) generates a limas of the game.
2 Preliminaries on multi-choice games
Let N be a set of players, usually of the form {1,2,...,n}, that consider
cooperation in a multi-choice environment, i.e. each player i ∈ N has a
ﬁnite number of feasible participation levels whose set we denote by Mi =
{0,1,...,mi}, where mi ∈ N = {1,2,...}. We consider the product MN = Q
i∈N Mi. Each element s = (s1,s2,...,sn) ∈ MN speciﬁes a participation
proﬁle for players and is referred to as a multi-choice coalition. So, a multi-
choice coalition indicates the participation level of each player. Then, m =
(m1,m2,...,mn) is the players’ maximal participation level proﬁle that plays
the role of the ”grand coalition”, whereas 0 = (0,0,...,0) plays the role of
the ”empty coalition”. We also use the notation M
+
i = Mi \{0} and MN
+ =
MN \ {0}. A cooperative multi-choice game is a triple  N,m,v , where
v : MN → IR is the characteristic function with v(0) = 0 that speciﬁes the
2players’ potential worth, v(s), when they join their eﬀorts at any activity level
proﬁle s = (s1,...,sn). For s ∈ MN we denote by (s−i,k) the participation
proﬁle where all players except player i play at levels deﬁned by s while
player i plays at level k ∈ Mi. A useful particular case is (0−i,k), when only
player i is active. We deﬁne the carrier of s by car(s) = {i ∈ N | si > 0}.
For s,t ∈ MN we use the notation s ≤ t iﬀ si ≤ ti for each i ∈ N and deﬁne
s ∧ t = (min(s1,t1),...,min(sn,tn)) and s ∨ t = (max(s1,t1),...,max(sn,tn)).
We denote the set of all multi-choice games with player set N and maximal
participation proﬁle m by MCN,m. Often, we identify a multi-choice game
 N,m,v  with its characteristic function v. For a game v ∈ MCN,m the
zero-normalization of v is the game v0 that is obtained by subtracting from
v the additive game a with a(jei) := v(jei) for all i ∈ N and j ∈ M
+
i , where
ei is the i-th standard vector in IR
N. Recall that a game v ∈ MCN,m is
called additive if the worth of each coalition s equals the sum of the worths
of the players when they all work alone at their level in s, i.e. v(s) = P
i∈N v(siei) for all s ∈ MN. A game v ∈ MCN,m is zero-monotonic if its
zero-normalization is monotonic, that is v0(s) ≤ v0(t) for all s,t ∈ MN with
s ≤ t. A game v ∈ MCN,m is called superadditive if v(s∨t) ≥ v(s)+v(t) for
all s,t ∈ MN with s ∧ t = 0. A game v ∈ MCN,m is called convex if
v(s ∧ t) + v(s ∨ t) ≥ v(s) + v(t) for all s,t ∈ M
N. (2.1)
Relation (2.1) is equivalent with
v(s + t) − v(s) ≥ v(¯ s + t) − v(¯ s) (2.2)
for all s, ¯ s,t ∈ MN satisfying ¯ s ≤ s, ¯ si = si for all i ∈ car(t) and s + t ∈
MN. Clearly, a convex multi-choice game is superadditive. In the sequel,
we denote the class of convex multi-choice games with player set N and
maximal participation proﬁle m by CMCN,m. Let v ∈ MCN,m. We deﬁne
M := {(i,j) | i ∈ N, j ∈ Mi} and M+ := {(i,j) | i ∈ N, j ∈ M
+
i }. A
(level) payoﬀ vector for the game v is a function x : M → IR, where for i ∈ N
and j ∈ M
+
i , xij denotes the payoﬀ to player i corresponding to a change
of activity level of i from j − 1 to j, and xi0 = 0 for all i ∈ N. One can




coordinates are numbered by corresponding elements of M+, where the ﬁrst
m1 coordinates represent payoﬀs for successive levels of player 1, the next
m2 coordinates are payoﬀs for successive levels of player 2, and so on. Let x
3and y be two payoﬀ vectors for the game v. We say that x is weakly smaller
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v(m), and is called level-increase rational if, for all i ∈ N and j ∈ M
+
i , xij
is at least the increase in worth that player i can obtain on his own (i.e.
working alone) when he changes his activity level from j − 1 to j, that is
xij ≥ v(jei) − v((j − 1)ei), or, equivalently, xij ≥ v(0−i,j) − v(0−i,j − 1).
A payoﬀ vector which is both eﬃcient and level-increase rational is called
an imputation. We denote by I(v) the set of imputations of v ∈ MCN,m.
The core C(v) of a game v ∈ MCN,m consists of all x ∈ I(v) that satisfy
X(s) ≥ v(s) for all s ∈ MN, i.e.
C(v) = {x ∈ I(v) | X(s) ≥ v(s) for each s ∈ M
N}.
A game whose core is nonempty is called a balanced game. The set Cmin(v)
of minimal core elements of v is deﬁned as
{x ∈ C(v) |  ∃y ∈ C(v) s.t. y  = x and y is weakly smaller than x}.
Two important solution concepts for multi-choice games, namely the Shapley
value (cf. Nouweland et al. (1995)) and the Weber set (cf. Nouweland et
al. (1995)), are based on marginal payoﬀ vectors which are deﬁned by using
admissible orderings. Let v ∈ MCN,m. An admissible ordering (for v) is a







satisfying σ((i,j)) < σ((i,j + 1)) for










(mi!); we denote the set of all admissible orderings for a







. Denote by sσ,k
the coalition deﬁned by
s
σ,k
i := max({j ∈ Mi | σ((i,j)) ≤ k} ∪ {0})
4for all i ∈ N. The coalition sσ,k is the participation proﬁle reached after k
steps according to the ordering σ. The marginal vector wσ,v : M → IR of v












for all i ∈ N and j ∈ M
+
i . In general, the marginal vectors wσ,v,σ ∈ Ξ(v), of
a multi-choice game v are not necessarily imputations, but for zero-monotonic
games they are. For multi-choice games, several diﬀerent Shapley-like values
are known. The Shapley value Φ(v) of v ∈ MCN,m is (cf. Nouweland et al.
(1995)) the average of all marginal vectors of wσ,v, in formula
Φ(v) = (Φij(v))i∈N,j∈M+















The Weber set, W(v), of a multi-choice game v is the convex hull of the
marginal vectors of v, i.e. W(v) = co{wσ,v | σ ∈ Ξ(v)}. Basic results for
convex multi-choice games that are used in this paper are: v ∈ CMCN,m iﬀ
W(v) = co(Cmin(v)) (Theorem 11.12 in Branzei, Dimitrov and Tijs (2005)),
and if v ∈ CMCN,m then W(v) ⊂ C(v) (Theorem 11.9 in Branzei, Dimitrov
and Tijs1 (2005)).
3 New characterizations of convex multi-choice
games
Our aim is to extend some characterizations of traditional convex games for
convex multi-choice games. Recall that a traditional cooperative game is
a pair  N,v , where N is a set of players and v is a characteristic function
v : 2N → IR with v(∅)=0. A game  N,v  is called convex if v(S∪T)+v(S∩T) ≥
v(S) + v(T) for all S,T ⊆ N.
We start this section by introducing the notions of exact multi-choice
game, subgame of a multi-choice game, and marginal game of a multi-choice
game with respect to a multi-choice coalition.
1Grabisch and Xie (2007) proposed notions related to the core and the Weber set of
a multi-choice game, and showed that in case of convexity there is still equality between
that core and that Weber set of the game.
5We call a balanced multi-choice game  N,m,v  an exact game if for each
s ∈ MN there is an x ∈ C(v) such that x(s) = v(s). Let v ∈ MCN,m and let
u ∈ MN. We denote by MN
u the subset of MN consisting of multi-choice
coalitions s ≤ u. The subgame of v with respect to u,  N,u,vu , is deﬁned by
vu(s) := v(s) for each s ∈ MN
u . We deﬁne the marginal game of v based on u
(or the u-marginal game of v),  N,m − u,v−u , by v−u(s) := v(s+u)−v(u)
for each s ∈ MN
m−u.
Lemma 3.1 Let v ∈ CMCN,m and let u ∈ MN
+. Then, v−u ∈ CMCN,m−u.
Proof. Note that for s,t ∈ MN
m−u we have
v−u(s ∨ t) + v−u(s ∧ t) = v((s ∨ t) + u) + v((s ∧ t) + u) − 2v(u)
= v((s + u) ∨ (t + u)) + v((s + u) ∧ (t + u)) − 2v(u)
≥ v(s + u) + v(t + u) − 2v(u) = v−u(s) + v−u(t),
where the inequality follows from the convexity of  N,m,v .
Remark 3.1 Since each convex game is also superadditive, we conclude
from Lemma 3.1 that if v ∈ CMCN,m then all its marginal games are super-
additive. The converse also holds true. This result has been independently
obtained for traditional cooperative games  N,v  by Branzei, Dimitrov and
Tijs (2004) and Martinez-Legaz (2006).
Theorem 3.1 Let v ∈ MCN,m and let u ∈ MN
+. Then the following asser-
tions are equivalent:
(i) Each u-marginal game of v, v−u, is superadditive;
(ii) v is a convex game.
Proof. We need still to prove that (i)=⇒(ii). Suppose that v−u is superad-
ditive. Then (2.1) holds true for all s,t ∈ MN with s∧t = 0 because v = v−0
is superadditive.
For s∧t = f  = 0, take p = s−f and q = t−f. Since
-
N,m − s ∧ t,v−f®
is superadditive, we obtain
0 ≤ v−f(p ∨ q) − v−f(p) − v−f(q) =
= v(p ∨ q + f) − v(p + f) − v(q + f) + v(f) =
= v(s ∨ t) − v(s) − v(t) + v(s ∧ t),
6i.e. v is convex.
For a traditional cooperative game  N,v , Biswas et al. (1999) (see also
Azrieli and Lehrer (2005)) proved that the game is convex if and only if each
subgame  S,v , with S ⊂ N, is an exact game. In the sequel, we prove that
a similar characterization holds true for multi-choice games.
Proposition 3.1 Each convex multi-choice game v is an exact game.
Proof. According to Theorem 11.12 in Branzei, Dimitrov and Tijs (2005), for
v ∈ CMCN,m, W(v) = co(Cmin(v)), implying that all marginal vectors wσ,v
are core elements. Take σ such that s is one of the ”intermediate coalitions”.
Then, x(s) = wσ,v(s) = v(s).
Theorem 3.2 Let v ∈ MCN,m. Then the following assertions are equiva-
lent:
(i)  N,m,v  is convex;
(ii)  N,u,vu  is exact for each u ∈ MN
+.
Proof. (i) → (ii) follows from Proposition 3.1 because each subgame of a
convex game is convex, and hence exact.
(ii) → (i): Take s,t ∈ MN. Since the subgame vs∨t is exact, there is
x ∈ C(vs∨t) such that x(s ∧ t) = vs∨t(s ∧ t) = v(s ∧ t).
Now, using x(s ∨ t) = vs∨t(s ∨ t) = v(s ∨ t), we obtain
v(s ∨ t) + v(s ∧ t) = x(s ∨ t) + x(s ∧ t) = x(s) + x(t) ≥ v(s) + v(t).
4 Monotonic allocation schemes
for multi-choice games
Inspired by Sprumont (1990) (see also Hokari (2000), Thomson (1983,1995))
who introduced and studied the interesting notion of population monotonic
allocation scheme (pmas) for traditional cooperative games, we introduce
here for multi-choice games the notion of level-increase monotonic allocation
scheme (limas). Recall that a pmas for a (traditional) cooperative game
 N,v  is an allocation scheme [aS,i]S∈2N\{∅},i∈S such that:
7(i) (aS,i)i∈S ∈ C(vS) for each S ∈ 2N \ {∅}, where vS is the subgame
corresponding to S, i.e. vS : 2S → IR is the restriction of v : 2N → IR
to 2S;
(ii) aS,i ≤ aT,i for all S,T ∈ 2N \ {∅} with S ⊂ T and i ∈ S.
Let v ∈ MCN,m and let t ∈ MN
+. For i ∈ N, denote the set {1,2,...,ti} by
Mt





i is called a level-increase monotonic allocation
scheme (limas) if:




ij for all s,t ∈ MN
+ with s ≤ t, for all i ∈ car(s) and for all
j ∈ Ms
i (level-increase monotonicity condition).
Remark 4.1 Note that such a limas is a defective |MN
+| × |M+|-matrix,
whose rows correspond to multi-choice coalitions and whose columns corre-
spond to elements of M+ arranged according with the increasing ordering for
players and for each player with respect to his participation levels. In each
row t there is a core element of the multi-choice subgame vt, with ”∗” for
all components xij, with i ∈ N and j ∈ {ti + 1,...,mi}. The level-increase
monotonicity condition implies that, if the scheme is used as regulator for
the (level) payoﬀ distributions in the multi-choice subgames players are paid
for each one-unit level increase (weakly) more in larger coalitions than in
smaller coalitions.
Remark 4.2 A necessary condition for the existence of a limas for a multi-
choice game v is the existence of core elements for vt for each t ∈ MN.
But this is not suﬃcient, as in the case of traditional cooperative games
which can be seen as multi-choice games where each player has exactly two
participation levels. A suﬃcient condition is the convexity of the game as we
see in Theorem 4.1.
Let v ∈ MCN,m and x ∈ W(v). Then we call x limas extendable if there





i such that am
ij = xij for each i ∈ N and j ∈ M
+
i .
In the next theorem we show that convex multi-choice games have a limas.
Speciﬁcally, we prove that each Weber set element is limas extendable. In
the proof, restrictions of σ ∈ Ξ(v) to subgames vt of v will play a role. It
8will be useful to look at such σ as being a sequence of ﬂags fi, i ∈ N,
signaling the players’ turns to one-unit level increase according with their
sets of participation levels. Then, for each t ∈ MN
+, the restriction of σ
to t, denoted here by σt, can be obtained from the sequence of ﬂags of σ
by ”removing” (notation ”∗”) for each player i ∈ N exactly mi − ti ﬂags
fi starting from the back of that sequence. We illustrate this procedure in
Example 4.1.
Example 4.1 Consider the multi-choice game  N,m,v  with N = {1,2,3},
m = (2,1,2) and v a supermodular function. Consider σ1 ∈ Ξ(v) expressed
in terms of ﬂags as σ1 = (f3,f1,f3,f2,f1). Note that this ordering generates












Now, consider the multi-choice coalition t = (1,1,1) and the correspon-
ding subgame  N,t,vt . Then, the restriction of σ1 to t is the ordering σ1
t
which can be expressed in terms of ﬂags as (f3,f1,∗,f2,∗); it generates the









Theorem 4.1 Let v ∈ CMCN,m and let x ∈ W(v). Then x is limas exten-
dable.
Proof. Since x is in the convex hull of the marginal vectors wσ,v of v, it
suﬃces to prove that each marginal vector wσ,v is limas extendable, because
then the right convex combination of these limas extensions gives a limas
extension of x.








ij for each t ∈ MN
+,
i ∈ N and j ∈ Mt
i, where σt is the restriction of σ to t (obtained via the
procedure described above and illustrated in Example 4.1). We claim that




ij for each i ∈ N and j ∈ M
+
i since vm = v. Further,
each multi-choice subgame vt, t ∈ MN
+, is a convex game, and since mσt,vt ∈
W(vt) ⊂ C(vt) (cf. Theorem 11.9 in Branzei, Dimitrov and Tijs (2005)), it
follows that (at
ij)i∈N,j∈Mt
i ∈ C(vt). Hence, the scheme satisﬁes the stability
condition.
9To prove the participation monotonicity condition, take s,t ∈ MN
+ with
s ≤ t, i ∈ car(s), and j ∈ Ms
i ⊂ Mt






ij = v(u−i,j) − v(u−i,j − 1), where (u−i,j) is the intermediary
multi-choice coalition in the maximal chain generated by the restriction of σ




ij = v(¯ u−i,j) − v(¯ u−i,j − 1).
Note that, since s ≤ t, in the maximal chain generated by σs the turn
of i to increase his participation level from j − 1 to j will come not later
than the same turn in the maximal chain generated by σt, implying that
(u−i,j) ≤ (¯ u−i,j). Furthermore, (¯ u−i,j) ≤ m. Then,
a
s
ij = v(u−i,j) − v(u−i,j − 1) ≤ v(¯ u−i,j) − v(¯ u−i,j − 1) = a
t
ij,
where the inequality follows from the convexity of v.
Speciﬁcally, we used relation (2.2) with (u−i,j − 1) in the role of ¯ s,






is a limas extension of wσ,v.
Further, the total Shapley value (cf. Nouweland et al., 1995) of a convex





i with the Shapley value
of the multi-choice subgame vt in each row t, is a limas.
Example 4.2 Consider the convex multi-choice game  N,m,v  with N =
{1,2}, m = (2,1), v((0,0)) = 0, v((1,0)) = 5, v((2,0)) = 6, v((0,1)) = 3,
v((1,1)) = 9, v((2,1)) = 13.
There are three orderings on M+ = {(1,1),(1,2),(2,1)} : σ1 = (f1,f1,f2),
σ2 = (f1,f2,f1) and σ3 = (f2,f1,f1). The corresponding marginal vectors
mσ1,v, mσ2,v, mσ3,v are extendable to the following level-increase monotonic
schemes:
(2,1) 5 1 7 5 4 4 6 4 3
(1,1) 5 ∗ 4 5 ∗ 4 6 ∗ 3
(2,0) 5 1 ∗ ; 5 1 ∗ ; 5 1 ∗
(0,1) ∗ ∗ 3 ∗ ∗ 3 ∗ ∗ 3
(1,0) 5 ∗ ∗ 5 ∗ ∗ 5 ∗ ∗
.
10Then, the total Shapley value Φ(v) generates the limas
(2,1) 16/3 3 14/3
(1,1) 16/3 ∗ 11/3
(2,0) 5 1 ∗
(0,1) ∗ ∗ 3
(1,0) 5 ∗ ∗
.
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